How Patriarch Kirill fused his office with his own personal power
Theologian Regina Elsner argues Patriarch Kirill has fused his office with his own authority, legitimizing Russia’s war and silencing dissenting clergy.
Kirill (Gundyayev), Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus’, has shaped the church he leads — the Russian Orthodox Church — like almost no other head of a church before him.
Orthodoxy likes to invoke its own synodality. The 34th Apostolic Canon — an early church law governing how bishops within a region relate to one another — requires that the bishops of a people recognize a “first” among them, but that this first do nothing without the consent of all.
In nearly eighteen years as patriarch, Kirill has dissolved that balance. Under him, the office of patriarch is no longer a service to the unity of the church, but an expression of one person’s claim to power.
In Kirill, person and timeless office have become one. What he says counts as the voice of the church, and whoever contradicts him counts as an enemy of the church.
Bound to those in power
For his 80th birthday, Moscow is dedicating a monumental exhibition to him at the Manege — a large 19th-century exhibition hall near the Kremlin — staging him as the country’s patron saint.
Under his leadership, the Russian Orthodox Church has become an absolutist-run institution whose hierarchy readily legitimizes a genocidal war of aggression and takes part, through denunciation and propaganda, in building and sustaining a repressive state.
Patriarch Kirill embodies the strand of Russian Orthodoxy that, since 1946 — the year of his birth — has built itself a fixed place within the identity of the political system through its close ties to those in power.
1946 was the year Joseph Stalin’s government established a church foreign-affairs office, which throughout the decades of Soviet atheist rule represented state interests abroad under the guise of church diplomacy and ecumenical peace work.
Kirill himself worked at this church foreign-affairs office — the Department for External Church Relations — from the 1970s onward, and led it from 1989, making him the face of Russian Orthodoxy on the ecumenical stage straight through the upheavals of the 1990s.
He learned the language of ecumenism, its diplomatic customs, the strategies for exerting political influence on church interests, and the weaknesses of the so-called “dialogue of love.”
Among those weaknesses: an unshakable faith in the sincerity of ecumenical partners in dialogue, and trust in the moral integrity of a church that had endured decades of terrible state persecution.
Historical narrative as the guiding theme
Kirill managed, masterfully, to convert the martyrdom of Orthodox believers under Soviet rule into his own personal capital — blurring his personal and institutional entanglement with the repressive Soviet, and now Russian, state.
Constructing history has become the guiding theme of Kirill’s tenure as patriarch since 2009. He laid the groundwork himself, among other things through the World Russian People’s Council, which he helped establish in 1993 and which, through a close interlocking of church and political elites, has gradually constructed the identity of post-Soviet Russia.
“Traditional values” were formulated and tested in that forum before Kirill, in 1999, described the conflict between liberalism and “traditional cultures” as the decisive conflict of the 21st century.
In 2015, those very “traditional Russian spiritual-moral values” became, for the first time, part of the Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy, and in 2022 Kirill declared it a patriotic duty to go to war against Ukraine in defense of those values.
In Kirill’s telling, Russia’s “God-fearing army” has been victorious from the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380 — literally, in Russian, the “Snipe’s Field,” after the bird once common there — all the way to the Great Patriotic War of 1945, and this narrative sits at the core of his vision of history.
That’s why the Moscow birthday exhibition is also, in part, a collection of war illustrations paired with matching icons. Already in the 1990s, he pushed for close partnership between the Russian armed forces and the Russian Orthodox Church; thanks to his efforts, military chaplains are now a fixture at the front.
As early as 2009, Kirill described the nuclear shield of the Soviet Union, and later Russia, as an act of divine providence meant to protect a sanctified Russia from external enemies.
Ideas, and the treatment of “inner enemies”
Many of Kirill’s ideas, systematized in his recently published book War: Beyond Its Visible Causes and Consequences, are neither new nor confined to the war against Ukraine. They reflect a worldview that has developed over decades.
Kirill has positioned the church as the bearer of “cultural memory,” and he decides which version of the past gets told. The threat of external enemies, and the defense against them, is a fixed part of that narrative.
What’s newer than this construction of history, though, is Kirill’s merciless treatment of “inner enemies” — Orthodox believers and priests who question church and state war propaganda, or who explicitly oppose it with Christian messages of peace.
Kirill punishes critical voices within the church swiftly, with gag orders, reprimands, dismissals, and removals from office, and hands them over to state persecution without hesitation. Denunciation and coercion have become fixed parts of the church’s institutional repertoire under Kirill, so that the church offers no safe space whatsoever for people who, out of conscience, reject the war and the repression in Putin’s Russia.
For many political institutions, Kirill’s shared responsibility for the Russian war, for the dehumanization of the Ukrainian population by the Russian military, and for the unchecked repression of dissenters inside Russia, is beyond dispute.
The appropriate response to that is sanctions and prosecution. Within church circles, how to deal with him remains unresolved, and fraternal birthday blessings will likely illustrate that again this year. Behind them lies a wish to look past the person’s abysses out of respect for the church office — as though the two could still be separated.
Kirill himself has erased that separation, by binding the office to his own person and wrapping his person in the sanctity of the office. Respect for the office — even on his 80th birthday — becomes, in effect, protection for the man who abuses it, and abandonment of his victims.
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How Patriarch Kirill fused his office with his own personal power
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Kirill (Gundyayev), Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus’, has shaped the church he leads — the Russian Orthodox Church — like almost no other head of a church before him.
Orthodoxy likes to invoke its own synodality. The 34th Apostolic Canon — an early church law governing how bishops within a region relate to one another — requires that the bishops of a people recognize a “first” among them, but that this first do nothing without the consent of all.
In nearly eighteen years as patriarch, Kirill has dissolved that balance. Under him, the office of patriarch is no longer a service to the unity of the church, but an expression of one person’s claim to power.
In Kirill, person and timeless office have become one. What he says counts as the voice of the church, and whoever contradicts him counts as an enemy of the church.
Bound to those in power
For his 80th birthday, Moscow is dedicating a monumental exhibition to him at the Manege — a large 19th-century exhibition hall near the Kremlin — staging him as the country’s patron saint.
Under his leadership, the Russian Orthodox Church has become an absolutist-run institution whose hierarchy readily legitimizes a genocidal war of aggression and takes part, through denunciation and propaganda, in building and sustaining a repressive state.
Patriarch Kirill embodies the strand of Russian Orthodoxy that, since 1946 — the year of his birth — has built itself a fixed place within the identity of the political system through its close ties to those in power.
1946 was the year Joseph Stalin’s government established a church foreign-affairs office, which throughout the decades of Soviet atheist rule represented state interests abroad under the guise of church diplomacy and ecumenical peace work.
Kirill himself worked at this church foreign-affairs office — the Department for External Church Relations — from the 1970s onward, and led it from 1989, making him the face of Russian Orthodoxy on the ecumenical stage straight through the upheavals of the 1990s.
He learned the language of ecumenism, its diplomatic customs, the strategies for exerting political influence on church interests, and the weaknesses of the so-called “dialogue of love.”
Among those weaknesses: an unshakable faith in the sincerity of ecumenical partners in dialogue, and trust in the moral integrity of a church that had endured decades of terrible state persecution.
Historical narrative as the guiding theme
Kirill managed, masterfully, to convert the martyrdom of Orthodox believers under Soviet rule into his own personal capital — blurring his personal and institutional entanglement with the repressive Soviet, and now Russian, state.
Constructing history has become the guiding theme of Kirill’s tenure as patriarch since 2009. He laid the groundwork himself, among other things through the World Russian People’s Council, which he helped establish in 1993 and which, through a close interlocking of church and political elites, has gradually constructed the identity of post-Soviet Russia.
“Traditional values” were formulated and tested in that forum before Kirill, in 1999, described the conflict between liberalism and “traditional cultures” as the decisive conflict of the 21st century.
In 2015, those very “traditional Russian spiritual-moral values” became, for the first time, part of the Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy, and in 2022 Kirill declared it a patriotic duty to go to war against Ukraine in defense of those values.
In Kirill’s telling, Russia’s “God-fearing army” has been victorious from the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380 — literally, in Russian, the “Snipe’s Field,” after the bird once common there — all the way to the Great Patriotic War of 1945, and this narrative sits at the core of his vision of history.
That’s why the Moscow birthday exhibition is also, in part, a collection of war illustrations paired with matching icons. Already in the 1990s, he pushed for close partnership between the Russian armed forces and the Russian Orthodox Church; thanks to his efforts, military chaplains are now a fixture at the front.
As early as 2009, Kirill described the nuclear shield of the Soviet Union, and later Russia, as an act of divine providence meant to protect a sanctified Russia from external enemies.
Ideas, and the treatment of “inner enemies”
Many of Kirill’s ideas, systematized in his recently published book War: Beyond Its Visible Causes and Consequences, are neither new nor confined to the war against Ukraine. They reflect a worldview that has developed over decades.
Kirill has positioned the church as the bearer of “cultural memory,” and he decides which version of the past gets told. The threat of external enemies, and the defense against them, is a fixed part of that narrative.
What’s newer than this construction of history, though, is Kirill’s merciless treatment of “inner enemies” — Orthodox believers and priests who question church and state war propaganda, or who explicitly oppose it with Christian messages of peace.
Kirill punishes critical voices within the church swiftly, with gag orders, reprimands, dismissals, and removals from office, and hands them over to state persecution without hesitation. Denunciation and coercion have become fixed parts of the church’s institutional repertoire under Kirill, so that the church offers no safe space whatsoever for people who, out of conscience, reject the war and the repression in Putin’s Russia.
For many political institutions, Kirill’s shared responsibility for the Russian war, for the dehumanization of the Ukrainian population by the Russian military, and for the unchecked repression of dissenters inside Russia, is beyond dispute.
The appropriate response to that is sanctions and prosecution. Within church circles, how to deal with him remains unresolved, and fraternal birthday blessings will likely illustrate that again this year. Behind them lies a wish to look past the person’s abysses out of respect for the church office — as though the two could still be separated.
Kirill himself has erased that separation, by binding the office to his own person and wrapping his person in the sanctity of the office. Respect for the office — even on his 80th birthday — becomes, in effect, protection for the man who abuses it, and abandonment of his victims.
Hope you loved reading this article. Global Catholic is powered by readers like you.
We have no corporate owner or funding agencies. Our in-depth commentaries, features and conversations are not behind the paywall.
We don’t carry advertisements as we want to offer a clutter-free reading experience.
To sustain and grow Global Catholic, we need to raise US$250,000.
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